Comment, Medical Peer Review: The Need to Organize a Protective Approach by Mills, Don Harper
Health Matrix: The Journal of Law-
Medicine
Volume 1 | Issue 1
1991
Comment, Medical Peer Review: The Need to
Organize a Protective Approach
Don Harper Mills
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/healthmatrix
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Health Matrix: The Journal of Law-Medicine by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Don Harper Mills, Comment, Medical Peer Review: The Need to Organize a Protective Approach, 1 Health Matrix 67 (1991)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/healthmatrix/vol1/iss1/7
Comment
MEDICAL PEER REVIEW: THE NEED TO
ORGANIZE A PROTECTIVE APPROACH
Don Harper Mills, M.D., JD.t
INTRODUCTION
EFFECTIVE MEDICAL PEER review consists of monitoring,
correcting and improving patient care activities, even though
they may already meet existing standards. Hospital-based physi-
cians should and presently do dominate peer review activities be-
cause they have access to pertinent information and are in a
position to issue appropriate sanctions. Most physicians may not
know this, though they may appreciate the significance of increas-
ing governmental intrusion into the peer review process. Unless
physicians can offer credible evidence of their own management, ex-
ternal organizations will usurp control, by setting standards of prac-
tice and initiating extra-medical systems for monitoring practice
activities.
Physicians are concerned that effective peer review is based on
the accumulation and analysis of information about their perform-
ance. They are uncomfortable about creating the very ammunition
others will use against them. Several years ago, courts opened the
flood gates to malpractice plaintiffs by allowing them access to peer
review information.1 Since then, most state legislatures have en-
acted special rules to protect both committee data and its analysis.2
t Medical Director, Professional Risk Management Group. Long Beach California,
Clinical Professor of Pathology, USC School of Medicine, Los Angeles, California; B.S., Uni-
versity of Cincinnati (1950); M.D., University of Cincinnati (1953); J.D. University of South-
ern California, School of Law (1958); Support for this research was provided in part by the
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, Medical Malpractice Program. The author acknowl-
edges the special assistance of Marsha Montgomery, Natalie A. Napierala, Stewart A. Binke
and Charlotte Buford of the the Case Western Reserve University School of Law and Orley
H. Lindgren of the Institute for Medical Risk Studies, Sausalito, California.
1. See, e.g. Kinney v. Super. Ct., 255 Cal. App. 2d 106, 109, 63 Cal. Rptr. 84, 87
(1967).
2. ALA CODE § 34-24-58 (1985); ALAsKA STAT. § 18.23.030 (1986); ARIz. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 36-445.01 (1987); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1157 (1987); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-
43.6 (1989); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-19a (1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24 § 1768
(1987); D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-505 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.101 (1988); GA. CODE
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In a civil suit, plaintiffs still have access to their own medical infor-
mation, but not peer review assessments of their physician's care
and management.' While many medical staff members do not trust
the courts to uphold these statutes, others have been oversold on
their effectiveness. The purpose of this article is to counsel hospitals
and medical staffs that these protective statutes do work when prop-
erly enforced.
A SURVEY OF STATUTES
Forty-eight states and the District of Columbia now have stat-
utes that impede discovery, the admissibility of documents and in-
formation developed in the hospital and medical staff peer review
process in civil litigation.4 Legislatures developed these statutes be-
cause physicians were reticent to subject peer review processes to
public scrutiny.' For example, California physicians were rudely
awakened to their state's liberal discovery rule when an appellate
court held that a plaintiff in a medical malpractice suit had substan-
tial fishing rights into a hospital's peer review system.6 A plaintiff
ANN. § 31-7-143 (1985); HAW. REV. STAT. § 624-25.5 (1985); IDAHO CODE § 39-1392b
(1985); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 8-2102 (1988); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-12.6-2 (1986);
IOWA CODE § 258A.6 (1988); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4915 (1987); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 311.377 (Baldwin 1987); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44:7(D) (West 1982); ME. REv. STAT. tit.
32, § 3296 (1988); MD HEALTH OCC. CODE ANN. § 14-1601(d) (1987); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 111, § 204 (a) (West 1987); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 14.57(23XCallaghan 1988);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.64 (1988); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-63-9 (1987); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 537.035 (1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-16-203 (1987); NEa. REv. STAT. § 71-2048
(1971); NEV. REv. STAT. § 49.265 (1987); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 329:29 (1987); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 41-9-5 (1989); N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 6527 (Consol. 1988); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 131E-95 (1988); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-08-01 (1976); OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§ 23051.251 (Baldwin 1990); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 79, § 16-17 (1988); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 41.675 (1989); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. § 63-425.4 (Purdon 1978 & Supp. 1990); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 5-37.3-7 (1987); S.C. CODE ANN. § 40.71-20 (Law. Co-op. 1986); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 364-26.1 (1986); TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-6-219 (1990); TEx. REv. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 4495b (1990); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-25-3 (1989); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 26,
§ 1443 (1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.17 (1984); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.250
(1988); W. VA. CODE § 30-3C-3 (1986); WIs. STAT. § 146.38 (1989); Wyo. STAT. § 35-17-
105 (1988).
3. See supra note 1.
4. See supra note 2. Neither Arkansas nor New Jersey protects peer review committee
documents. The former has a protective statute, applying only to proceedings and records of
committees of the state or local professional association, not to hospitals and medical staffs.
See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 20-9-503 (1990). The latter statute applies to in-hospital committees
dealing with utilization review and not to the broader scope of patient care evaluation. See
N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A: 84A-22.8 (1976); Young v. King, 136 N.J. Super. 127, 344 A.2d 792
(1975).
5. See supra note 2.
6. Kinney, 255 Cal. App. 2d at 109, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 87.
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could discover other physicians' comments regarding the compe-
tency of the defendant physician.7 Moreover, a plaintiff could iden-
tify the critical physicians involved and subject them to pretrial
discovery proceedings to obtain further information.' Although
much of this information was inadmissible at trial, the plaintiff's
ability to access such a data base clearly facilitates his development
of relevant, admissible evidence. California Evidence Code § 1157,1
enacted in apparent response to this court's decision, prompted a
majority of states to enact similar legislation during the malpractice
insurance crisis in the 1970's.10 Legislation of this type has with-
stood judicial scrutiny. For example, a California court noted that
where medical staff committees are responsible for the competence
of staff practitioners, the quality of in-hospital medical care depends
on the committee members' candor in evaluating their associates'
medical skills and in regulating their staff privileges."' Section
1157 was enacted on the theory that external access to committee
peer review investigations stifled candor and inhibited objectivity. 2
Unavailability of recorded evidence of a physician's incompetence
may jeopardize or prevent a plaintiff's recovery in a medical mal-
practice suit. 3 Section 1157, therefore, represents a legislative
choice between competing public concerns by embracing the goal of
medical staff candor at the cost of impairing plaintiffs' access to
evidence.' 4
WHOSE RECORDS ARE PROTECTED?
An important element of a number of state statutes which limit
discoverability of peer review documents is that only documents
generated by these committees are protected. 5 These states, how-
7. Id at 114, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 90.
8. Id. at 109, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 87.
9. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1157 (West 1990).
10. See supra note 2.
11. Machett V. Super. CL, 40 Cal. App. 3d 623, 628-29, 115 Cal. Rptr. 317, 320 (1974).
12. Id. § 1157 states that documents of a hospital medical staff committee dealing with
patient care evaluation are not discoverable. See supra note 9. Section 1157 does not, how-
ever, protect one who surreptitiously, or even negligently makes such public statements.
Such statements pose security problems for medical staffs, but there is a difference between
security and non-discoverability. The former is a data management problem which requires
hospitals to protect against unauthorized disclosures; the latter is a procedural issue that has
already been decided by the legislatures in favor of hospital's and their medical staffs.
13. See Machett, 40 Cal. App. 3d. at 628-29, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
14. Id.
15. Thirty-nine states and the District of Columbia have such limitations. Nine other
states limit their protections to documents of other specifically identical review organizations.
See supra note 2.
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ever, do not protect documents which are generated by other hospi-
tal entities even though such documents may have been created by
an organized medical staff and may deal with patient care evalua-
tion.16 Since these statutes contravene the concept of liberal discov-
ery, the burden of establishing entitlement to non-disclosure rests
with the party resisting discovery, not the party seeking it. 17 It is
imperative, therefore, for hospitals to create peer review systems
and organizations to fit the precise language of their protective stat-
ute. Hospitals often conduct peer review under the auspices of
committees, even when the activity is carried out by departments or
sections of a hospital as required by the Joint Commissions on Ac-
creditation of Health Care Organizations (JCAHO).'8 Peer review
activities, therefore, should be conducted by a committee of the re-
spective department or section in order to protect the non-discover-
ability of their documents. Washington and Texas require these
committees to be "regularly constituted."19 Therefore, hospitals in
other states should clearly identify how their committees will be
constituted in their Medical Staff Bylaws, Quality Assurance Plan,
and if the committee is intra-departmental or intersectional, in their
Department or Sectional Rules and Regulations.
Documents created by individuals may not be protected from
discovery if those people were not acting on behalf of committees
with respect to patient care evaluation.2' For example, a Chief of
Staff who summarily dismisses another physician from the staff as a
function of his own office and not as a function of the peer review
committee, creates discoverable information.2' The actions of hos-
pital departmental and service chiefs, who restrict the privileges of
subordinates, are also discoverable.22 Persons acting for a commit-
tee, however, create non-discoverable documents when they involve
investigations ultimately considered by the committee. For exam-
ple, a nurse epidemiologist's investigation of an infection written
prior to consideration by the Infection Control Committee was held
16. Id. A committee is a legally definable term and most courts tend to limit the protec-
tion of non-discovery statutes to that organization.
17. Santa Rosa Memorial Hosp. v. Super. Ct., 174 Cal App. 3d 711,727, 220 Cal. Rptr.
236, 247. (1985).
18. JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDIATION OF HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATIONS MAN-
UAL FOR HOSPITALS, ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS (1991).
19. Coburn v. Seda, 101 Wash.2d. 270, 677 P.2d. 173 (1984); Gulf Coast Req. Blood
Center Relator v. Houston, 745 S.W.2d. 557 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988).
20. See, eg., Marchand v. Henry Ford Hosp., 398 Mich. 163, 167, 247 N.W.2d. 280,
282 (1976).
21. Doe v. St. Joseph's, 113 F.R.D. 677 (N.D. Ind. 1987).
22. Machand, supra note 20 at 167, 247 N.W.2d at 282.
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to be a committee document because her duty to the committee
included performance of this function.23
States which protect medical staff committee documents from
discovery may not protect administrative files in offices of CEO's or
in governing board offices.24 In these states, communication be-
tween protected committees may occur,25 but documentation of
those communications should reside in the original committee fies.
Governing boards can and should be given specific information con-
cerning patient care evaluation by the Quality Assurance Commit-
tee or by the Medical Executive Committee, but documents
retained by the governing board should be general in context. All
specific information should be returned to the protected committee
files.
WHOSE COMMITTEES ARE INVOLVED?
Each state defines by statute the structure of a protected com-
mittee or organization; however, states vary as to the jurisdiction
under which these organizations exist. In some states, the commit-
tee or review organization must be under the aegis of the medical
staff,26 while in the majority of states, the committee may be either
administrative, medical staff or both.27 In either case, the hospital
or medical staff bears the burden of demonstrating that the particu-
lar committee complies with the specific language of the protective
statute.2
8
Some states require that protection be limited to documents and
information of medical staff committees which deal with patient
23. In re "K", 132 N.H. 4, 561 A.2d 1063 (1989). See also, Jorday v. Ct. App. for
Fourth Sup. Jud. Dist., 701 S.W.2d 644 (Tex 1985).
24. Matchett v. Super. Ct. for County of Tuba, 40 Cal. App. 3d. 623, 115 Cal. Rptr. 347
(Cal. Ct. App. 1974); Shelton v. Moorehead Memorial Hosp., 318 N.C. 76, 347 S.E.2d 824
(1986); Anderson v. Breda, 103 Wash.2d. 901, 700 P.2d 737 (1985); State, Good Samaritan
Medical Center v. Maroney, 123 Wis.2d 89, 365 N.W.2d 887 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985).
25. Harris Hosp. v. Schattman, 734 S.W.2d 759 (Tex. 1987).
26. Ala., Cal., Colo., Conn., D.C., Fla., Haw., Ind., Iowa, Mass., Miss., Mont., Nev.,
N.C., Or., S.C. See supra note 2.
27. Ark., Ariz,, Del., Ga., Idaho, Ill., Kan., Ky., La., Me., Md., Mich., Minn., Mo.,
Nev., N.H., N.M., N.Y., N.D., Ohio, Okla., Pa., R.I., S.D., Tenn., Tex., Utah, Vt., Va.,
Wash., W.Va., Wis., Wyo. See supra note 2.
28. Santa Rosa Memorial Hosp. v. Super. Ct., 255 Cal. App. 2d at 109, 63 Cal Rptr. at
87. No court has overturned these protective non-discovery statutes. Kentucky, however,
may be an exception since its highest court overruled legislation aimed at protecting from
discovery documented committee communications. See Sweasy v. King's Daughters Memo-
rial Hosp., 771 S.W.2d. 812 (Ky. 1989). The legislation was struck down because it con-
flicted with a restriction in Kentucky's constitution which requires that laws relate to no
more than one subject and the subject must be expressed in the title.
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care evaluation. Such committees may be multi-disciplinary.29
Therefore, the documents of the medical staff committee may be
protected even if a majority of the members are non-physicians.30
DOES NON-DISCOVERABILITY LIMIT TESTIMONY?
Many states' statutes provide that no individual in attendance at
a protective committee meeting is required to testify as to what
transpired at the meeting.31 Such provisions, however, do not ex-
plicitly prohibit voluntary testimony by individuals in attendance.
Thus, a California court concluded that where a physician volun-
teered committee information and testimony, neither the defendant
physician nor the hospital could preclude him from disclosing the
otherwise non-discoverable information.32 The court strictly con-
strued the statute, which, on its face, prohibited any requirement to
testify, but allowed the voluntary release of information.33 When
California physicians opposed this decision, hospital medical staffs
responded by adopting specific bylaws which precluded any disclo-
sure of information acquired through the committee process."'
Physicians who violate this bylaw are subject to disciplinary pro-
ceedings. In numerous states, the relevant statutes address both re-
29. Santa Rosa Memorial Hosp. v. Super. Ct. 255 Cal. App. 2d. at 109, 63 Cal Rptr. at
87.
30. For example, infection control committees which are structured according to the
JCAHO requirements are still considered medical staff committees, despite their inter-disci-
plinary makeup. See supra, note 18.
31. Alaska, Ariz., Cal., Conn., Del., Fla., Ga., Haw., Idaho, Ind., Kan., Ky., Minn.,
Miss., Mo., Nev., N.Y., N.C., Ohio, Pa., Tenn., Vt., W.Va., Wyo. See supra note 2.
32. West Corina Hosp. v. Super. Ct., 41 Cal. 3d. 846, 718 P. 2d. 119, 226 Cal. Rptr. 132
(1986).
33. Id. at 855, 718 P.2d at 122, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 136.
34. MEDICAL STAFF PEER REVIEW ACTIVITY CONFIDENTIALITY
AGREEMENT. As a member of a Medical Staff Committee involved in the evaluation and
improvement of the quality of care rendered in the hospital, I recognize that confidentiality is
vital to the free and candid discussions necessary to effective medical staff peer review activi-
ties. Therefore, I agree to respect and maintain the confidentiality of all discussions, delibera-
tions, records, and other information generated in connection with these activities, and to
make no voluntary disclosures of such information except to persons authorized to receive it
in the conduct of medical staff affairs.
Furthermore, my participation in peer review and quality assurance activities is in reliance
on my belief that the confidentiality of these activities will be similarly preserved by every
other member of the medical staff or other individual involved. I understand the hospitals
and the medical staff are entitled to undertake such action as is deemed appropriate to ensure
that this confidentiality is maintained, including action necessitated by any breach or





quired and voluntary releases of information.35 The hospital
medical staffs in these states do not need to adopt bylaws similar to
those found in California.
THE ULTIMATE CONFLICT: THE NON-DISCOVERY
STATUTE v. HOSPITAL CORPORATE LIABILITY
Long before the landmark case of Darling v. Charleston Com-
munity Memorial Hospital,36 hospitals had the responsibility of di-
recting their medical staffs to select appropriate physicians for
medical staff appointments and to conduct appropriate disciplinary
proceedings. The Darling case expanded the hospital's responsibil-
ity by requiring it to ensure that its medical staff's conduct ade-
quate on-going peer review.3" Under this theory of hospital
corporate liability, the hospital's duty to screen and monitor the
medical staff committees stems directly from its responsibility to pa-
tients and not from any paternalistic position it may have towards
physicians on its medical staff. Decisions in other states have ex-
tended the corporate liability theory to cases where the hospital and
its medical staff failed to investigate existing evidence in determin-
ing whether a physician is competent to be on the medical staff and
whether the physician should lose his medical credentials.38 For
example, a California court held a hospital, with notice of prior law-
suits against the defendant physician, potentially liable for failing to
investigate those civil actions to determine whether medical staff
privileges should continue.3 9 The court found that the hospital not
only had a duty to ensure that its medical staff evaluate such cases,
but also to determine whether it conducted periodic reviews of the
defendant physician in an appropriate manner.' Query: if peer re-
view had been carefully and properly conducted, would the com-
mittee have recommended revocation or suspension of the
defendant physician's staff privileges?
A hospital's duty to ensure that physicians properly conduct
peer review conflicts with the protective nature of discovery statutes
such that a plaintiff is denied access to information necessary to
35. Alaska, Conn., Fla., Ga., Idaho, Ind., Ky., Mass., Minn., Miss., Mo., N.M., Ohio,
Or., Pa., R.I., Vt., W.Va., Wyo. See supra note 2.
36. Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 Il.2d. 326, 211 N.E.2d. 253
(1965).
37. Id. at 332, 211 N.E.2d at 257.
38. See infra note 39.
39. Elam v. College Park Hosp., 132 Cal. App. 3d. 332, 183 Cal. Rptr. 156 (Ct. App.
1982). See also Purcell v. Zimbelman, 18 Ariz. App. 75, 500 P.2d. 335 (Ct. App. 1972).
40. Elam, 132 Cal. App. 3d. at 346, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 165.
1991]
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bring a cause of action against the hospital to enforce that duty.
This conflict may not have been considered by those legislating the
confidentiality statutes. When such a conflict has arisen, courts
have upheld the purpose of the non-discovery statutes: to en-
courage physicians to exercise candor and frankness in their self-
evaluation for the benefit of community health.41
Despite the non-discovery statutes, some information is avail-
able to a plaintiff in a malpractice action against a medical staff
member and that member's hospital. A few states allow a plaintiff
to determine not only the status of a defendant physician's privi-
leges at a hospital,4' but also whether a physician's patient manage-
ment was evaluated by a peer review committee.4" A plaintiff may
obtain from a board of governors administrative documents and
records regarding the defendant physician, including a physician's
educational transcripts.44 Beyond such limited access, however,
non-discovery statutes bar a plaintiff from obtaining further infor-
mation.45 Thus, a plaintiff should be able to procure all available
public information against a defendant physician and the hospital
and should be able to solicit protected expert opinions regarding the
plaintiff's care and management while in the hospital. At trial, a
jury may function as a credentials committee to determine whether
a medical staff and its hospital negligently allowed the defendant
physician to remain on the staff or to perform procedures which
were beyond his capacity. Physicians should know that while non-
discovery statutes are effective, any public information available to
a plaintiff may be considered by a jury. A hospital and its medical
staff should see that its credentials committee operates effectively in
order to prevent a jury from retrospectively reviewing such public
information.
THE INCIDENT REPORT: AN ENIGMA OR SOLUTION?
Most hospitals have created incident reporting systems to docu-
41. Humana Hosp. Desert Valley v. Super. Ct., 54 Ariz. App. 396, 742 P.2d 1382
(1987); W. Covina Hosp. v. Super. Ct., 153 Cal. App. 3d 136, 200 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1984); Snell
v. Super. Ct., 158 Cal. App. 3d 44, 204 Cal. Rptr. 200 (1984); Brown v. Super. Ct., 168 Cal.
App. 3d 489, 214 Cal. Rptr. 267 (1985); Willing v. St. Joseph Hosp., 176 Ill. App. 3d, 531
N.E. 2d 824 (1988); Shelton v. Morehead Memorial Hosp., 318 N.C. 76, 347 S.E.2d 824
(1986).
42. Richter v. Diamond, 108 Ill. 2d. 265, 483 N.E.2d. 1256 (1985); Anderson v. Breda,
103 Wash.2d. 901, 700 P.2d. 737 (1985).
43. Brown v. Super. Ct., 168 Cal. App. 3d., 214 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1985).
44. Willing v. St. Joseph Hosp., 176 Ill. App. 3d. 737, 531 N.E.2d 824 (1988).
45. See supra note 2.
[Vol. 1:67
MEDICAL PEER REVIEW
ment problematic events. These systems may serve several purposes
such as informing the hospital attorney (or insurance carrier, if any)
of the events that may produce litigation and gathering data indicat-
ing trends that would lead to quality of care improvement pro-
grams. In California, for example, if the goal of an incident report is
solely to communicate information from the hospital to the attor-
ney, the document is non-discoverable because of the protection of
the attorney-client privilege.46 The privilege, however, may be
waived if nurses or physicians use the document for quality of care
purposes.47 Utilizing a document solely for these purposes, how-
ever, does not invoke the non-discovery protection unless the peer
review system is under the jurisdiction of the appropriate peer re-
view organization. In California, therefore, it is important for hos-
pitals to consider the purpose of their incident reports and to
structure a proper organization governing them to ensure that
either the attorney/client privilege or the peer review non-discovery
protection applies. If the primary purpose of the incident reporting
system is to improve quality of care rather than to communicate
with an attorney, it is necessary to structure a medical staff commit-
tee that has jurisdiction over both the creation and the evaluation
of these reports.48 A risk management committee will suffice. Also,
a hospital's incident reporting system should be altered to fit the
applicable protective statute. To accomplish this, a medical staff
risk management committee could assume control over the creation
46. Sierra Vista Hosp. v. Super. Ct., 248 Cal. App. 2d. 359, 56 Cal. Rptr. 387 (Ct. App.
1967).
47. This result was achieved in Colorado when copies of the incident report were sent to
the Director of Nursing as well as the CEO. Bernardi v. Community Hosp. Ass'n, 166 Colo.
280, 443 P.2d 708 (1968).
48. There have been few court decisions governing incident reports. In North Carolina,
for example, an incident report is not protected by the attorney/client privilege and is discov-
erable from the CEO of the hospital. See, e.g. Shelton v. Morehead Memorial Hosp., 318
N.C. 76, 347 S.E.2d 824 (1986). Furthermore, in Missouri, an incident report is protected by
the attorney/client privilege if the primary purpose is communication, although the docu-
ment may also be used for patient care evaluation. See, e.g. Enhe v. Anderson, 733 S.W.2d
462 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987). In Massachusetts, incident reporting systems are both required
and protected, regardless of their purpose. See, e.g. Beth Israel Hosp. Ass'n v. Board of
Registration in Medicine, 401 Mass. 172, 515 N.E.2d 574 (1987). In Michigan, incident re-
ports are protected from discoverability if an individual or committee is assigned a review
function. See, e.g. Gallagher v. Detroit - Macomb Hosp. Ass'n., 171 Mich. App. 761, 431
N.W.2d 90 (1988). In Kansas, Pennsylvania, Arizona, New York and North Carolina, inci-
dent reports would not be discoverable if the reporting systems were organized as peer re-
view patient care evaluation processes. See, e.g. Porter v. Snyder, 115 F.R.D. 77 (D. Kan.
1987); Wood v. Geriatrics Medical Center, Inc., No. 85-6447 (E.D. Pa., filed July 11, 1986);
Lincoln Hosp. Health Center v. Super. Ct., 159 Ariz. 456, 768 P.2d. 188 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1989); Shelton v. Morehead Memorial Hosp., supra note 41.
1991]
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and review of these documents, acting as a patient care evaluation
committee.
In 1979, the California Hospital Association developed a model
incident reporting system, the Notification System, to be placed
under the control of a medical staff committee. Neither the reports
nor their evaluations would be discoverable. Each committee
would develop its own rules for providing information to its hospi-
tal's insurance carrier or risk management service. That informa-
tion could alert the insurance carrier, its attorney, or the risk
management service to potential problems for purposes of investiga-
tion. Therefore, information generated from a well fashioned hos-
pital reporting system should be protected from discovery. This
would increase the importance of risk management by encouraging
greater involvement by the medical staff in assessing and managing
risk. One study has shown that medical staff involvement substan-
tially improves a hospital's position in litigation.49 Both the admin-
istration and the medical staff of a hospital should participate in the
risk management committee to decide how to report incidents, who
should report them, and how that data should be used.
CONCLUSION
Physicians need not be unduly concerned about the discovery of
hospital peer review data, as long as that data is generated and
evaluated in strict compliance with protective statutes. In turn,
hospitals could protect against discovery of their incident reports by
placing them under the control of a peer review committee or hos-
pital organization with comparable functions. As a result, this
would encourage greater involvement and cooperation by the medi-
cal staff and the administration in conducting peer review activities.
49. MORLOCK & MALITZ, Do Hospital Risk Management Programs Make a Difference?
in FINAL REPORT TO THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH SERVICES RESEARCH AND
HEALTH CARE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (1988).
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